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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? HANDGUN REGULATION
IN A POST-HELLER WORLD
Lindsey Craven*

INTRODUCTION
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.1
Debate over the meaning of these twenty-seven words has run rampant for
centuries. The conflict has revolved around the basic meaning of the Second
Amendment: does it protect an individual’s right to own a gun, or does it merely
extend as far as was necessary to maintain the state militias in 1791?2
In June 2008 the Supreme Court directly addressed the individual versus collective
right question in District of Columbia v. Heller.3 The case involved gun laws in
Washington, D.C. that made it a crime to carry any unregistered firearm, but prohibited the registration of handguns.4 The D.C. laws also required all lawfully owned
firearms in the home to be unloaded and disassembled.5 The plaintiff, Dick Heller,
a special police officer at the Federal Judicial Center, was “authorized to carry a handgun while on duty,” but was denied a permit to have his handgun in his home.6 He
challenged the laws as an unconstitutional restraint on his Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms.7 Speaking to the actual meaning of the Second Amendment
for the first time in history,8 the Court ruled that “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on
the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms.”9
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2010; B.A., Portland State University, 2007.
Thank you to my parents, sister, and friends for reading prior drafts and putting up with my
endless gun law talk. Your support is priceless.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2
See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed By Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of The
Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 167, 174–76 (2008) (discussing the
individual and collective right models).
3
554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
4
Id. at 2788 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)).
5
Id. (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001)).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment is Back, Baby,
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 127.
9
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
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This seemingly clear determination, however, left open many questions about
the extent of this newly-recognized individual right.10 Federal, state, and local laws
regulating gun ownership abound in this country.11 While the Court proclaimed that
the Heller decision does nothing to undermine regulations prohibiting “the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”12 the establishment of
an individual right to own a gun opens the door for gun rights advocates to challenge
the constitutionality of state regulations that limit that right.
This Note will examine a few areas of state firearm laws that are likely to be
addressed in the cases following Heller. Part I of this Note will briefly discuss the
nature of the right established by Heller and the likelihood that the Court will incorporate the Second Amendment, applying it to the states. It will argue that under Court
precedent, the Second Amendment qualifies as a fundamental right that should apply
to the states as well as the federal government. Part II will argue that the acknowledgment of an individual right to gun ownership, and the language used in Heller, indicate the Court’s intent to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny when evaluating future
challenges to gun regulations. Part III will examine the areas of gun regulation that
are most vulnerable to constitutional challenges under strict scrutiny, including discretionary permitting systems for the concealed carrying of weapons, and laws that
designate public colleges and universities as gun-free zones.
I. INCORPORATION
While the Court’s decision in Heller recognized an individual right to bear arms,13
the scope of the case limited the Court’s opinion to the Second Amendment’s applicability to action by the federal government.14 Because Washington, D.C. is under
federal jurisdiction, the Court was not ruling on state action.15 In 1937, in Palko v.
Connecticut,16 the Court blazed a new trail in constitutional law by establishing that,
under certain circumstances, the rights protected under the Bill of Rights would also
apply to the states.17 However, without this “incorporation,” the text of the Bill of
10

Klukowski, supra note 2, at 167 (“[S]cores of questions arise from this groundbreaking
proposition, such as the legality of gun prohibitions and confiscations, which firearms are
protected, what level of scrutiny applies, whether the right is fundamental, and whether the
right is incorporated.”); Neily, supra note 8, at 127.
11
See, e.g., NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, COMPENDIUM OF
STATE LAWS GOVERNING FIREARMS (2007), available at http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/
Compendium.pdf (“[There are] over 20,000 ‘gun control’ laws on the books in America . . . .”).
12
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
13
Id. at 2799.
14
Id. at 2813 n.23.
15
Christopher Keleher, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Death Knell For Illinois
Handgun Bans?, 96 ILL. B.J. 402, 405 (2008).
16
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17
Dorothy J. Hernaez, Note, Parker v. District of Columbia: Understanding the Broader
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Rights limits its protection to actions by the federal government.18 The Court has
never taken explicit steps to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states.19
In fact, past Supreme Court cases have explicitly limited the Second Amendment’s
reach to the federal government.20 In light of the Court’s recognition of an individual
right to bear arms, a clarified position on incorporation is a necessary next step in
Second Amendment jurisprudence.21 The Court will address this issue in the October
2009 Term: On September 30, 2009, the Court granted certiorari in McDonald v. City
of Chicago, agreeing to answer the question of “[w]hether the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.”22 This section will
argue that the standards for selective incorporation under the Due Process Clause, set
forth in Duncan v. Louisiana,23 and the language of Heller indicate that the Second
Amendment will be incorporated in the near future.24
Implications for the Future of Gun Control, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 693, 720 (2008)
(discussing incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights that “‘are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty’ or ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked
as fundamental’” (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 319, 324–26)).
18
Id. at 719 (“It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that the Bill of
Rights, by itself, does not protect the citizens of the United States from actions of state and
local governments.”).
19
See Cameron Desmond, Comment, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of
an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2008); Hernaez, supra note 17, at 718; Nelson Lund, The Past and Future
of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996).
20
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
553 (1875).
21
Hernaez, supra note 17, at 718.
22
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2009 WL 1640363 (2009)
(No. 08-1521); NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1521).
23
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
24
The question presented in McDonald gives the Court the ability to rule on incorporation under the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause would require the
Court to overturn its long-standing precedent, set in the Slaughter-House Cases, that the clause
does not incorporate the Bill of Rights. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
74 (1873). While many scholars question the continuing merits of Slaughter-House, see, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631 n.178
(2001); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1297–98 n.247 (1995), the likelihood of the Court
overturning such a landmark case and using the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the vehicle
for incorporation is unknown. Incorporation through the Due Process Clause is a much easier
case for the Second Amendment. The majority of this paper will address the impact of incorporation, not the method of achieving incorporation, a topic that has been addressed by many
eminent scholars. See, e.g., Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation
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In 1968, the Supreme Court clarified its position on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
power to apply federally-guaranteed rights to the states.25 The standard for incorporation became whether a right was “fundamental—whether, that is, [it] . . . is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”26 In Duncan, the analysis the
Court utilized to determine whether the right (in that case, the right to trial by jury)27
was fundamental included looking at (A) the history of the right; (B) the existence of
the right in the states; (C) popular support for the right; and (D) the purpose served by
the right.28 Because the right to trial by jury had a deeply-rooted history in the United
States and preceding legal systems, existed in all states, had great public support, and
served the purpose of preventing governmental oppression, the Court concluded that
the right to trial by jury was fundamental.29 The language and structure of the Court’s
opinion in Heller suggest that the Court considers the right to bear arms to be fundamental according to the Duncan test, and thus will rule in favor of incorporation.30
A. History of the Right
In Duncan, the Court traced the history of the right to trial by jury back to its
English counterparts, recognizing the fundamental nature of the right in the history
and tradition of the English way of life.31 Similarly, the Heller majority opinion
paid significant attention to the historical background of the right to bear arms. The
Second Amendment, the Court argued, was predated by the English Bill of Rights,
which contained a guarantee that Protestants would be allowed to keep arms for their
defense.32 Because of the prior oppression of dissenters by the Stuart Kings Charles II
and James II, and later of the colonists by George III, the Court determined that the
right to keep and bear arms for individual self-defense had become a “fundamental”
right for English subjects by the time the Second Amendment was codified.33 The
historical recognition of the right as fundamental supports arguments in favor of
incorporation.
through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72
MO. L. REV. 1 (2007); Lund, supra note 19, at 46–55; Michael P. O’Shea, Federalism and the
Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 215–17 (2008).
25
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148–50 & n.14. For a general discussion of the development of the
selective incorporation doctrine, see Lawrence, supra note 24, at 50–56.
26
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149–50 n.14.
27
Id. at 149.
28
Id. at 151–58; see also Hernaez, supra note 17, at 721 (quoting David A. Lieber, The
Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from
the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 95 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1103 (2005)).
29
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151–58.
30
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2783 passim (2008).
31
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151–53.
32
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798.
33
Id. at 2798–99.
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B. Existence of the Right in the States
During its examination of the meaning of the text of the Second Amendment, the
Court in Heller touched on the existence of state constitution counterparts to the Second
Amendment.34 Four states adopted similar provisions between independence and the
ratification of the Bill of Rights, and another nine ratified their own state provisions
between 1789 and 1820.35 The Court used the contemporary language and interpretations of state provisions regarding arms to establish the meaning of the Federal Second
Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right, and not just a collective right.36
When the Court considers incorporation, it will also look at current treatment of
the right to keep and bear arms in the states. Forty-four states have a clause in their
constitutions guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms.37 Forty-two of those clauses
contain explicit language extending the right to the individual.38 These provisions will
undoubtedly support a finding of state approval of an individual right to bear arms, as
did the fact, in Duncan, that every state guaranteed the right to trial by jury.39
C. Popular Support for the Right
The Heller majority opinion was heavily rooted in history and the original
meaning of the Second Amendment. The majority interpretation of the amendment
was based on the eighteenth century meanings of the words used in the text, and was
“guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished
from technical meaning.’”40 By looking at the commonly understood meaning of
the words “the people,”41 “arms,”42 “keep arms,”43 and “bear arms,”44 at the time of
34

Id. at 2802–04.
Id. at 2802, 2803.
36
Id. 2802 (“Our interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state
constitutions that preceded and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.”).
37
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Inst. for Legislative Action, Guarantees Of The Right To Arms In State
Constitutions, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=63 (last visited Feb. 17,
2010).
38
Desmond, supra note 19, at 1059.
39
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968).
40
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
41
Id. at 2790–91.
42
Id. at 2791 (“The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773
edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined ‘arms’ as ‘weapons of offence, or armour of
defence.’ . . . Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined ‘arms’ as ‘any
thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or
strike another.’”(internal citations omitted)).
43
Id. at 2792 (“The phrase ‘keep arms’ was not prevalent in the written documents of the
founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing
the right to ‘keep Arms’ as an individual right unconnected with militia service.”).
44
Id. at 2793 (“From our review of founding-era sources . . . ‘bear arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia.”).
35

836

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:831

ratification, the Court concluded that “[the Second Amendment] guarantee[s] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”45
The Heller majority opinion also examined the treatment of the Second Amendment after ratification.46 The Court recounted the post-enactment commentary of
contemporaries of the drafters,47 pre-Civil War case law,48 and post-Civil War legislation49 and commentary,50 to “determine the public understanding” of the text, and
concluded that “virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century
after its enactment interpreted the amendment as we do.”51
When the Court decides whether to incorporate the Second Amendment, it will
likely consider current popular support for the individual right to bear arms, in addition
to historical support for the right.52 Before Heller was decided, seventy-three percent
of the American populace believed that they had the individual right to own firearms
unconnected to service in a militia.53 This belief has been confirmed by Heller, at
least on the federal level. In a 2008 poll conducted by Gallup, forty-two percent of
Americans reported owning a gun in their homes.54 There is overwhelming evidence
of the popular support for an individual construction of the right to bear arms, which
will favor incorporation.
D. Purpose Served by the Right
The final element the Court will examine to determine whether the individual
right to bear arms is fundamental under the Duncan test will be the purpose served
by the right. The majority in Heller focused a great deal on the intent of the framers
when drafting the Second Amendment.55 While acknowledging that the prefatory
clause56 plays a role in announcing the purpose of the amendment, the Court concluded that the prefatory clause does not limit the meaning of the amendment as a
whole.57 Indeed, the Court suggested that while the preservation of the militia was
45

Id. at 2797.
Id. at 2804–12.
47
Id. at 2805–07.
48
Id. at 2807–09.
49
Id. at 2809–11.
50
Id. at 2811–12.
51
Id. at 2805 (emphasis omitted).
52
Hernaez, supra note 17, at 723–24.
53
See Joan Biskupic, Do You Have a Legal Right to Own a Gun?, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
2008, at A1; see also Matthew Bennett, Misfire: How the Debate over Gun Rights Ignores
Reality, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 482, 486–87 (2008).
54
GALLUP, INC., Do You Have a Gun in Your Home?, in GUNS (Oct. 3–5, 2008), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/1645/Guns.aspx.
55
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801–02.
56
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State . . . .”).
57
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
46
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the purpose for which the amendment was codified, “most [Americans] undoubtedly
thought [the right] even more important for self-defense and hunting. . . . [Selfdefense] was the central component of the right itself.”58 The Court was explicit in
its determination that the purpose of the Second Amendment is directly related to
individual self-defense: “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the
Second Amendment right.”59
Other purposes served by the Second Amendment, and invoked by courts and
scholars, include prevention of governmental tyranny, recreation and hunting, and
Lockean notions of personal autonomy.60 These are all factors the Court will consider when deciding whether the purposes served by the right are important enough
to render the right to bear arms fundamental.
E. Conclusion on Incorporation
While the Court did not address incorporation or Duncan, all the elements of the
Duncan test were present in the Heller opinion. Even apart from Heller, the necessary
aspects of a fundamental right are present in the Second Amendment.61 This suggests that the Court will find that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental
right, and will incorporate the Second Amendment in McDonald. The remainder of
this Note will address additional issues that will arise after incorporation.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Though the Court recognized the individual right to keep and bear arms, the Court
did not set a standard of review for gun regulations in the Heller opinion, leaving the
question open for future litigation.62 The extent of the protection guaranteed by the
58

Id. at 2801.
Id. at 2817; see also id. at 2797 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we
find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.”).
60
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (2004); Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms
Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131 (2008).
61
See Klukowski, supra note 2, at 190 (“[U]nder the existing rules on incorporation, it
should certainly be incorporated if it also secures an individual right to self-preservation.”
(internal citations omitted)); Lawrence, supra note 24, at 58 (“Applying the Court’s standard—
i.e., whether the right protected ‘is fundamental—whether, that is, [it] is necessary to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty’—the inescapable conclusion . . . is that the Second
Amendment does indeed satisfy this test.” (emphasis omitted)); Lund, supra note 19, at 55 (“The
right protected by the Second Amendment meets the Court’s test of what is ‘fundamental’ far
more easily than other rights that have already been incorporated.”).
62
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821; see also Neily, supra note 8, at 128; Glenn H. Reynolds &
Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2035
(2008).
59
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Second Amendment will largely be determined based on the standard of review the
Court chooses to apply to regulations that limit the right to bear arms.63 Though the
application of standards of review is difficult to separate into distinct categories, the
traditional options for review include rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate
review.64 This section will briefly discuss each standard and its application to
Second Amendment cases. It will then argue that Heller indicates a move toward
strict scrutiny.
A. The Three Standards
Rational basis review “requires a court to uphold regulation so long as it bears a
‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate governmental purpose.’”65 Under this standard,
courts begin with a “presumption of constitutionality of the government’s regulations.”66 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the law is unconstitutional.67
As long as the government can show a rational link between the objective and the
law, the court will allow the law to stand.68 In the past, rational basis review has been
utilized when the right at stake is not a fundamental right or when the law does not
designate a suspect classification.69
Strict scrutiny is the other end of the spectrum and requires “reviewing with care
each . . . law to determine whether it is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.’”70 Strict scrutiny applies only to the most fundamental of rights,71
63

See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 685
(2007).
64
See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels
of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 161 (1984).
65
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
320 (1993)).
66
Hernaez, supra note 17, at 714.
67
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality.”).
68
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
69
Id. (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon
inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); see also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.”).
70
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.
74, 82 (1997)); see also Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 419, 425 (2009).
71
Klukowski, supra note 2, at 186 (“[T]he general rule for laws burdening fundamental
rights is strict scrutiny.”).
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and laws restricting those fundamental rights carry a presumption of unlawfulness.72
Under strict scrutiny, the state must prove that the restriction is “narrowly tailored”
to meet this compelling purpose,73 a much loftier challenge than the burden of rational
basis.74 Analysis of the “fit” between the regulation and the purpose includes assuring that the law is not overly inclusive, that it is the least restrictive means for achieving the stated goal, that it actually achieves the stated purpose, and that it leaves open
alternative ways of exercising the restricted right.75
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is substantially related to
an important governmental purpose.76 The burden is on the government to prove the
substantial relationship.77 Intermediate review, as its name indicates, is not as deferential as rational basis review, but is not as exacting as strict scrutiny. It has traditionally been applied in equal protection cases when the class involved was not a
suspect class, but shared “some of the characteristics of a suspect classification.”78
A version of intermediate review has also been applied in evaluating time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech,79 in commercial speech cases,80 and in privileges and
immunities cases.81
72

See Shaman, supra note 64, at 162; Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear
Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597, 599 (2006) (“Strict scrutiny, with its presumption of
unconstitutionality, is a standard of review traditionally used in areas where courts deem any
burdensome legislation to be ‘immediately suspect.’” (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
73
See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 425.
74
See Winkler, supra note 63, at 727.
75
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[A] governmental practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental rights’ . . . is to be
subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government
purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”); Desmond, supra
note 19, at 1069–70; Mark Tushnet, The Future of the Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 354, 359 (2008) (“[A] ‘fundamental’ right [can] be limited only for ‘compelling’ reasons,
and even then only by regulations that are pretty much guaranteed to accomplish real reductions in crime, violence, or gun violence.”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact:
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01
(2006) (“Narrow tailoring requires that the law capture within its reach no more activity (or
less) than is necessary to advance those compelling ends. An alternative phrasing is that the
law must be the ‘least restrictive alternative’ available to pursue those ends. This inquiry into
‘fit’ between the ends and the means enables courts to test the sincerity of the government’s
claimed objective.”).
76
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[The law] must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
77
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
78
Shaman, supra note 64, at 163.
79
See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
80
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
81
See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
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B. Application of Each Standard to Gun Laws
If a court were to apply rational basis review to the right to bear arms, the governmental interest in public safety would serve as the legitimate state interest.82 The government would not be required to prove that the challenged regulation actually had the
intended impact of making society safer; it would merely have to show a rational relationship between the regulation and safety.83 All gun regulations could rationally be
related to the general safety of society, and thus would be presumptively lawful. Plaintiffs challenging such laws would bear the burden of overcoming this presumption.
The same safety purpose that is “legitimate” under rational basis review would
have to be “compelling” to survive under strict scrutiny.84 Governments most likely
would be able to classify the general safety of society as a compelling interest.85 However, the government would also bear the burden of proving the tight fit between the
regulation and the compelling purpose.86 There is a lack of definitive statistics concerning the impact of gun regulations,87 which means the government would have a
difficult time producing the kind of proof necessary to justify placing restrictions on
a fundamental right.
Intermediate scrutiny has been the dominant standard invoked in gun regulation
cases and has taken the form of a “reasonable regulation” standard.88 A court looks
at the purpose behind enacting the law and compares it with the extent to which the
regulation burdens the individual right.89 If the law is a reasonable way of regulating the right and does not amount to an elimination of the right entirely, it is constitutional.90 This standard of review has proven to be an easy one for governments to
meet when it comes to gun regulations: of the hundreds of gun control laws passed
in the fifty states, only six have been invalidated since World War II.91
82

Desmond, supra note 19, at 1066–67 (2008).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
84
Winkler, supra note 63, at 727.
85
Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1095, 1132 (2000) (“Surely [public safety] is a compelling interest. What could be of much
higher priority?”).
86
Winkler, supra note 63, at 801.
87
Todd Barnet, Gun “Control” Laws Violate the Second Amendment and May Lead to
Higher Crime Rates, 63 MO. L. REV. 155, 189 (1998); Green, supra note 60, at 138. For a
discussion of the lack of clarity on the impact of requiring permits for carrying concealed
weapons, see infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. See also infra Part III for application of strict scrutiny to certain specific gun regulations.
88
See Desmond, supra note 19, at 1054–55; Amanda C. Dupree, Comment, A Shot Heard
‘Round the District: The District of Columbia Circuit Puts a Bullet in the Collective Right
Theory of the Second Amendment, 16 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 413, 417 (2008);
Winkler, supra note 63, at 712.
89
Desmond, supra note 19, at 1056.
90
Winkler, supra note 63, at 717.
91
Id. at 718 (“Under the reasonable regulation standard, courts uphold all but the most
arbitrary and excessive laws.”).
83
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C. Heller’s Effect on Standard of Review
Though reasonable regulation has been the standard for evaluating gun laws in
the states and at the federal level in the past,92 the Court’s decision in Heller called
into question this longstanding standard of review. In his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority for failing to set a standard of review for the Second Amendment.93
Indeed, the majority acknowledged that an explicit standard of review does not exist
and is not established by the opinion.94 However, the opinion gives clues to what
standard the Court will adopt in the future.
The most explicit attention the Court paid to a standard of review was to reject
rational basis as an option:
Obviously, [rational basis] could not be used to evaluate the extent
to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be
it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy,
the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. . . . If all
that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was
a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with
the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and
would have no effect.95
Of the three opinions, Justice Breyer’s dissent was the only one to explicitly suggest a standard of review, concluding that an “interest-balancing” standard would be
the most appropriate.96 Justice Breyer discussed Heller’s proposition that the Court
adopt strict scrutiny, and came to the conclusion that it would be impossible.97 In
evaluating the government’s interest in public safety under a strict scrutiny standard,
courts would always find the interest to be compelling, and would then have to evaluate the propriety of limiting a fundamental right for the sake of a compelling interest.98 As the analysis would always result in an “interest-balancing inquiry,” Justice
Breyer argued that the Court should simply establish an interest-balancing standard
of review.99 This interest-balancing inquiry would consist of a comparison of the
92

Id. at 690–91.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2868 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
94
Id. at 2821 (majority opinion) (“Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications of the right to keep and bear arms in doubt . . . . But since this case represents this Court’s
first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the
entire field . . . .”).
95
Id. at 2817–18 n.27.
96
Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 2851.
98
Id. at 2851–52.
99
Id. at 2852; see also Winkler, supra note 63, at 726 (“[W]hile [strict scrutiny] might
93
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extent to which the right was burdened with the purpose of the specific regulation.100
This test, though given a different name, bears a remarkable similarity to the reasonable regulation standard that has been utilized by the states for decades.101
The majority, however, denied that Justice Breyer’s analysis was appropriate in
Second Amendment cases.102 The Court stated,
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands
of government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.103
It continued that the right “to use arms in defense of hearth and home” is elevated
above all other interests.104 This language indicates that the Court, when given the
chance, will establish a strict scrutiny standard of review.
Even if the majority had not explicitly refuted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing
test and had not addressed the standard of review question at all, the Court’s implication that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right under the Duncan test105
would suggest a strict standard of review. In his brief to the Court, Heller argued in
favor of strict scrutiny on the grounds that the Second Amendment guarantees the most
fundamental of rights: “enabling the preservation of one’s life and guaranteeing . . .
liberty.”106 The brief also makes note that “fundamental rights are those ‘explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.’”107 Heller’s argument was affirmed by
the Court through its implication that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right,
rooted in the even more inherent right to self-defense.108 The Court also compared
require the narrowing of some gun control laws, heightened review may ultimately devolve
into a reasonable regulation-like standard still deferential to legislatures.”).
100
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101
See Desmond, supra note 19, at 1056 (“Under a reasonable regulation standard, a court
will strike down a law only to the extent that the burden on the individual right is unreasonable
in light of the legislature’s purpose for enacting the law. The test ‘focuses on the balance of the
interests at stake’ . . . .” (quoting Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 927 A.2d 1216, 1223
(N.H. 2007))); Hernaez, supra note 17, at 712 (“In determining what is reasonable . . . government interest should be weighed against the individual interest in bearing arms . . . .”); Winkler,
supra note 63, at 717 (“Courts applying the reasonable regulation standard go through the
formal motions of identifying the underlying governmental objectives and weighing those
goals against the burden on the individual.”).
102
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See supra Part I.
106
Brief for the Respondent, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), at 57.
107
Id. at 55–56 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973)).
108
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 (“By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had
become fundamental for English subjects.”); id. at 2801 (“[S]elf-defense . . . was the central
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the specific enumeration of the right to bear arms to “freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, [and] the right to counsel,”109 implying that the Second
Amendment should be afforded the same level of scrutiny as other specifically enumerated rights.
Proponents of gun control point to the Court’s statement that Heller did not call
into question any gun regulations except for D.C.’s110 as evidence that the Court had
no intention of overturning certain specific gun regulations.111 This language, however, only states that nothing in this specific opinion should be taken to call those
regulations into question. The constitutionality of regulations restricting the purchasing of firearms, restricting the concealed carrying of weapons, and establishing
gun-free zones was not an issue in Heller. Any statement about regulations other
than the challenged D.C. laws, whether affirming or nullifying them, is dicta and is
not controlling precedent. Furthermore, the Court specifically stated that it was not
addressing the application of the Second Amendment in every situation.112
Gun control advocates also place emphasis on the Court’s statement in footnote
twenty-six that laws restricting gun ownership by felons, the creation of gun-free
zones, and laws imposing qualifications for ownership are “presumptively lawful,”113
as evidence that the Court intends to adopt a lower level of scrutiny.114 Because strict
scrutiny starts from the position that any infringement on a fundamental right is presumptively unlawful,115 advocates argue that the Court could not have intended to
apply strict scrutiny to such regulations.116 This phrase does indeed make the Court’s
position on a standard of review unclear. However, until a law is overturned by the
courts, it will remain in effect and remain presumptively lawful. The footnote is nonbinding dicta and carries little weight when placed next to the numerous occasions
component of the right itself.”); id. at 2817 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment right.”).
109
Id. at 2817–18 n.27.
110
Id. at 2816–17 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
111
The Heller Decision: What Does it Mean for Gun Control?, LEGAL ACTION (Legal
Action Project of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Washington, D.C.), Fall, 2008,
at 3 [hereinafter Brady Center Newsletter].
112
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (“Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications
of the right to keep and bear arms in doubt . . . . But since this case represents this Court’s
first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the
entire field . . . .”).
113
Id. at 2817 n.26.
114
See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 62, at 2039–40; Brady Center Newsletter, supra
note 111.
115
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
116
See Brady Center Newsletter, supra note 111.
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in which the Court indicates its inclination to adopt strict scrutiny as the overarching
standard of review.117
D. Conclusion on Standard of Review
Whether applying strict scrutiny to gun regulations is a wise course of action is
a policy question and is beyond the scope of this Note. Scholars have argued for and
against strict scrutiny, and have debated the likelihood that the Court will ever apply
strict scrutiny to regulations limiting rights conferred by the Second Amendment.118
One factor in this ongoing policy discussion, however, must be the impact that applying strict scrutiny would have on gun regulations. The remainder of this Note will
examine some categories of firearm regulations that would be most vulnerable under
strict scrutiny.
III. IMPACT OF STRICT SCRUTINY
If the Court does establish strict scrutiny as the standard of review for Second
Amendment cases, the resulting analysis of gun regulations will be much more exacting than it has been in the past. States will be required to demonstrate the tight fit
between limitations on the right to bear arms and the compelling governmental purpose of safety.119 As mentioned previously, strict scrutiny consists of assuring that
a regulation is narrowly tailored: it must not be overly inclusive, it must be the least
restrictive means of achieving the compelling governmental purpose, it must leave
open other avenues for exercising the right, and it must actually achieve the compelling purpose.120 If the Court adopts a truly strict version of strict scrutiny, there are
several areas of regulation that will be subject to challenges on Second Amendment
grounds. These include discretionary “may issue” laws regulating the carrying of
concealed weapons, and the creation of gun-free zones on public college campuses.
A. “May Issue” Concealed-Carry Laws
The right to carry a concealed weapon varies significantly from state to state.
Illinois and Wisconsin, for example, do not allow anyone to carry a concealed firearm
117

Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on the District of Columbia v.
Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 675–76 (2008).
118
For arguments in favor of strict scrutiny, see generally Brief for the Respondent, supra
note 106; Lund, supra note 19; Massey, supra note 85. For arguments against strict scrutiny,
see Desmond, supra note 19; Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller:
Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428–30 (2009); Winkler,
supra note 63.
119
See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
120
See id.
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in public, with the exception of peace officers.121 On the opposite end of the spectrum,
Alaska and Vermont do not even require an individual to have a permit to carry a concealed weapon.122 The rest of the states fall somewhere in between.123 Thirty-one
states have what have come to be known as “shall issue” laws: as long as a citizen
meets the minimum requirements set forth in the statute, the relevant state agency
must issue the individual a permit to carry a concealed weapon.124 While requirements
vary, they tend to include a minimum age, a background check to guarantee an individual is not precluded from owning firearms,125 payment of a licensing fee, a firearms
safety class, and fingerprinting.126
The remaining eight states have discretionary “may issue” concealed-carry laws.127
The discretion in the application of these laws comes in the form of the state agent’s
evaluation of the applicant’s need for the concealed weapon.128 For example, in
California applicants must show that “good cause exists for the issuance.”129 The
statute does not define what “good cause” is.130 Even upon proof of good cause, however, the statute only says the county sheriff may issue the permit.131 In the wake of
Heller, Second Amendment incorporation, and under a strict scrutiny analysis, these
eight states could be forced to remove the subjective elements of their concealed
weapon laws.132
121

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2009) (“A person commits the
offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly: . . . [c]arries or possesses in any
vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or
fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm . . . .”); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (West 2009) (“Any person except a peace officer who goes armed with
a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.”).
122
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 11. Alaska has a permit
system to establish reciprocity with other states. Id.
123
See Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, http://www.concealedcampus.org/state
-by-state.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
124
Ryan S. Andrus, The Concealed Handgun Debate and the Need for State-to-State
Concealed Handgun Permit Reciprocity, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 130–32 (2000) (reviewing
state “shall issue” laws as of 2000).
125
Preclusion from firearm ownership can come from being a convicted felon, an illegal
alien, or having mental illness, among other things. See id. at 131.
126
Id.; see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Inst. for Legislative Action, Federal and State Firearm
Laws, http://www.nraila.org/GunLaws (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
127
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1441 (2009);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306 (West 2009); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 2009); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 400.00 (Consol. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11 (2009).
128
Andrus, supra note 124, at 135.
129
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050.
130
Id. (containing no definition of “good cause”).
131
Id.
132
Neily, supra note 8, at 159.
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In analyzing the constitutionality of these laws, courts would have to begin with
the purpose of the permit system, with the states being required to prove that their
statutes were rooted in a compelling governmental purpose.133 The rationale for the
discretionary laws is rooted in public safety, which, as addressed above, will always
be designated a compelling governmental interest.134 Specifically, the discretionary
permit process is based on the state’s desire to limit the number of private citizens
carrying concealed weapons in public, and to only allow private citizens to carry concealed arms in limited situations.135 By limiting the permit process, the state limits
the number of firearms in public, reduces the chance of theft, misuse, or accidents with
firearms, and thus makes society and individuals safer.136 The states, therefore, will
have little difficulty convincing the courts that the first prong of a strict scrutiny
analysis is satisfied.
The “narrowly tailored” requirement of the strict scrutiny analysis is where the
“may issue” laws will fail. The laws do not indicate what “good cause” is for issuing
permits, leaving the determination up to the individual actors within the state licensing agencies.137 For a law to be narrowly tailored, it must include guidelines indicating under what circumstances the exceptions apply.138 Without specific guidelines
as to what actually makes an individual qualified to get a permit, the law cannot be
considered narrowly tailored to achieve the stated purpose. “The arbitrariness inherent in allowing states to define good cause is one of the chief deficiencies of the
Discretionary system.”139
In fact, discretionary “may issue” laws allow for and have resulted in discriminatory implementation.140 For example, in New York, while influential and famous
individuals are awarded concealed-carry permits, taxi drivers, crime victims, and
133

See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny analysis).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (arguing that safety will always be a
compelling purpose).
135
See Andrus, supra note 124, at 135; Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall
Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 681
(1995).
136
See Steven W. Kranz, Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can
Small Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 662 (2006).
137
Andrus, supra note 124, at 135.
138
Massey, supra note 85, at 1129 (“[Licensing] [s]chemes that vest uncontrolled discretion
in government officials to grant or deny such permits should be presumptively invalid. Licensing laws that cabin official discretion by directing issuance of ‘concealed carry’ permits only
to those persons who have demonstrated some special or exceptional need for personal armed
self-defense should also be treated as presumptively invalid. Such laws materially infringe
the individual right to armed self-defense because they disable ordinary citizens from exercising
their own judgment concerning the necessity of preparations for armed self-defense.”).
139
Andrus, supra note 124, at 136.
140
Cramer & Kopel, supra note 135, at 682–86 (relaying incidents of discriminatory
permitting of weapons even upon a showing of fear for one’s life).
134
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ordinary citizens are routinely denied the opportunity to carry a concealed weapon.141
The “may issue” laws also result in wide variations of permit issuance within states.142
Under strict scrutiny, the state would also have the burden of proving that the discretionary permitting system actually achieved the stated goal of increasing public
safety, and that it was the least restrictive way of implementing that policy decision.143
This would be a difficult task, given that the statistics on concealed-carry laws are
inconclusive.144 Proponents of gun control offer empirical studies concerning crime
rates and the prevalence of handguns, and conclude that more people owning guns
results in more violence.145 Proponents of the right to carry concealed weapons claim
that when people are allowed to carry concealed, criminals are deterred from crime
because they never know when others around them are armed.146 Without conclusive
evidence that fewer guns in public actually makes society safer, the government will
have a hard time proving that there is a legitimate means-ends fit between the goal
and the method of implementation.
In addition, even if the government can prove that fewer guns will result in a safer
society, it will still have to prove that the discretionary permitting system is the least
restrictive means of achieving the goal of public safety. The “may issue” laws, as they
stand, state that there are certain circumstances under which an individual could be
granted a permit to carry a concealed weapon.147 The state agent, however, still has
the ability to deny a permit, even when an individual has a good reason for wanting
one.148 The “may issue” language itself allows the agent to deny a permit, even when
141

Id. at 684–85.
See id. at 712–13. For more statistics on permit issuance in California, see OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF CAL., BUREAU OF FIREARMS, CARRY CONCEALED WEAPON LICENSES
REPORT 1987–2007, available at http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/forms/pdf/ccwissuances2007.pdf.
143
See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
144
See Barnet, supra note 87, at 189; see also John J. Donohue, The Impact of ConcealedCarry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 287, 325 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (“With data problems making it unclear whether the
county or state data are more reliable, with the lack of good instruments available to directly
address the problems of endogeneity and the lack of good controls available to capture the
criminogenic influence of crack, it is hard to make strong claims about the likely impact of
passing a shall-issue law.”); Desmond, supra note 19, at 1060 (“The difficulty, however, lies
in the latter part of the test—that the regulation be ‘narrowly tailored’ to meet the compelling
interest. This often requires a showing that there were no less restrictive means, a difficult
task given the lack of evidence that specific gun control measures actually reduce violence
and/or accidents.”).
145
See EARL E. MCDOWELL, AMERICA’S GREAT GUN GAME 103–22 (2007).
146
See generally John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-toCarry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997) (arguing from empirical data that
having the right to carry concealed deters crime).
147
See supra note 127 (statutes within).
148
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 2009) (“The sheriff of a county, upon proof that the
person applying [meets all the criteria,] . . . may issue to that person a license to carry [a
concealed weapon].” (emphasis added)).
142
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the individual meets the criteria established by the legislature, which is much more
restrictive than adhering to clearly defined criteria.149
Furthermore, these laws are vague in their requirements of “good cause,” and
in their allowance for subjective implementation. The Supreme Court has addressed
the problem of vague statutes in the past, and has struck down laws as “void-forvagueness.”150 While the doctrine originally addressed certain notice aspects of criminal statutes,151 the Court has also written about the dangers of vague laws in the form
of discriminatory implementation:
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
applications.152
“May issue” laws are inherently arbitrary as they vest all discretion in issuing licenses
with the local law enforcement and do not provide any guidelines as to the standards
for receiving a permit, yet they allow for a permit to be denied on the whim of the
local official. The Court has indicated that some vagueness will be permitted in certain areas of the law,153 but that “the most important factor affecting the clarity that the
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”154 As the Court
has held that the individual right to keep and bear arms is constitutionally protected,
gun regulations will be subjected to a more stringent vagueness test.
149

Neily, supra note 8, at 159 (“Arbitrary, unreviewable government discretion over the
enjoyment of a right has always been anathema in American constitutional law . . . .”).
150
Jeffrey Merle Evans, Recent Development, Void-For-Vagueness—Judicial Response
to Allegedly Vague Statutes—State v. Zuanich, 92 Wn. 2d 61, 593 P.2d 1314 (1979), 56 WASH.
L. REV. 131, 132–35 & nn.11–14 (1980).
151
Sarah Sparks, Case Note, Deteriorated vs. Deteriorating: The Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine and Blight Takings Norwood v. Horney, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1769, 1771–72 (2007).
152
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
153
Id. at 498–99 (“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates . . . depends in
part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face
economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation
in advance of action. . . . The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with
civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively
less severe.”).
154
Id. at 499.
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Discretionary “may issue” concealed-carry laws are aimed at achieving a compelling governmental interest, but are not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The
problem with “may issue” laws is in their discretionary application that subjectively
denies some citizens the opportunity to exercise their right to bear arms. Therefore,
under a standard of strict scrutiny, “may issue” laws will be deemed unconstitutional
in the wake of Heller and Second Amendment incorporation.155
B. Guns on College Campuses
Across the country, states prohibit individuals from bringing firearms onto public
college and university campuses.156 In the wake of the tragedy at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) in April of 2007,157 the right of students
and teachers to have weapons on campus has become a central issue in state legislatures.158 So far, public opinion and legislatures are not willing to open institutions of
higher education to firearms: as of this writing, only Utah has passed a measure to remove the gun-free designation from public colleges and universities.159 Fifteen states
allow each school to decide for itself whether to allow firearms or not, but few schools
have taken advantage of the choice and almost all schools remain gun-free.160
155

This is not to say that the states currently utilizing “may issue” laws must allow anyone
to carry a concealed weapon. The states could adopt policies akin to those of Wisconsin and
Illinois, completely prohibiting concealed carry, or they could adopt shall-issue laws with specific requirements as long as the subjective elements were removed. The constitutionality of
completely prohibiting concealed carry has not been addressed by the Court as of this writing.
156
Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, http://www.concealedcampus.org/state-by
-state.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2010) (“There are 24 states that expressly prohibit concealed
carry on college campuses by persons with a valid concealed handgun license/permit.”); see,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b) (West 2009) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . it shall
be unlawful for any person to carry to or to possess or have under such person’s control while
within a school safety zone or at a school building, school function, or school property . . . any
weapon . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (West 2009) (“No license issued pursuant to
this section shall authorize any person to carry a stun gun, concealed pistol or revolver into . . .
any elementary or secondary school facility; any junior college, community college, college
or university facility unless for the purpose of participating in any authorized firearms-related
activity . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309(b)(1) (West 2009) (“It is an offense for any
person to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed . . . any firearm . . . in any public or
private school building or bus, on any public or private school campus, grounds, recreation
area, athletic field or any other property owned, used or operated by any board of education,
school, college or university board of trustees, regents or directors for the administration of any
public or private educational institution.”).
157
John M. Broder, Suspect is Killed: ‘Horror and Disbelief’ at Virginia Tech-Separate
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1.
158
Joshua Molina, Utah Students Hide Guns, Head to Class, CNN.COM, Feb. 21, 2008, http://
www.cnn.com/2008/US/02/20/cnnu.guns/index.html; see also Allen Rostron, Incrementalism,
Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 550 (2008).
159
See Molina, supra note 158.
160
Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, supra note 123. As of this writing, three
states have legislation pending in their state legislatures that addresses concealed weapons on
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College campuses are their own species of gun-free zone: entry to the campus is
normally not restricted, making the gun-free status difficult to enforce.161 Most of the
students on college campuses (as opposed to, say, elementary or secondary schools)
are of legal age to own firearms.162 Finally, many students live on campus in addition
to attending classes and working there.163 The campus is their home, which makes
broad gun prohibitions more burdensome.164 This section will analyze two different
aspects of the gun-free requirements of most public institutions of higher education
in light of these unique characteristics: the prohibition against carrying concealed
weapons on campus, and the prohibition against keeping a firearm in a dorm room.
If school policies completely prohibiting firearms are challenged in courts and analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, they will likely be overturned, removing the
gun-free designation.165
1. Carrying Concealed Handguns on Campus
Even before the shootings at Virginia Tech, carrying guns on college campuses
was a hot-button issue.166 In the wake of the shooting, a new national organization
was formed called Students for Concealed Carry on Campus (SCCC), with the purpose of advocating the right of college students and professors, who already have
concealed-carry permits, to bring concealed weapons onto campus and into the classroom (informally called “campus carry”).167 The organization and other proponents
of campus carry argue that it is ridiculous that students who are of legal age and have
the right to carry concealed weapons everywhere else must surrender their arms once
campus. Id. at http://www.concealedcampus.org/pendinglegislation.php (last visited Feb. 17,
2010).
161
Rostron, supra note 158, at 558.
162
See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: AN EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND SELECTED LOCAL GUN LAWS
81–87 (2008).
163
According to the most recent U.S. Census data, 2,064,130 students live in college dormitories. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-26 TABLE 1. POPULATION
IN GROUP QUARTERS BY TYPE, SEX AND AGE, FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000 (Nov. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t26/tables/tab01.pdf.
164
Desmond, supra note 19, at 1068.
165
This section does not argue that all gun-free zones will be nullified. Areas that have
restricted access and limited entry points that allow for monitoring of the gun-free status of
the area, such as airports or the U.S. Capital, will likely be upheld. See id. This section will
only address the special characteristics of public college campuses that make their gun-free
zone status questionable under strict scrutiny. The right of private schools to make their campuses gun-free is much broader and implicates many more areas of law, including private
property rights and takings law.
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they arrive on campus.168 In states where concealed carrying is allowed, eliminating
that right on college campuses will not survive strict scrutiny.
Like almost all firearm restrictions, prohibiting guns on campus is a safety precaution, a compelling interest that the courts certainly would recognize. Before the
shooting at Virginia Tech, the school’s board of governors reaffirmed its gun ban,
declaring that it “w[ould] help parents, students, faculty and visitors feel safe on . . .
campus.”169 In addition, schools have an interest and a duty to provide an atmosphere
conducive to learning.170 The presence of handguns, some argue, interferes with that
learning environment by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and increasing the
likelihood of violence and accidents.171
Accepting the creation of a safe and open learning environment as a compelling
governmental purpose, a court hearing a challenge to a campus carry prohibition
would turn to the “fit” requirement of strict scrutiny. It would have to consider
whether the creation of gun-free zones actually achieves this purpose and whether the
law was narrowly tailored to it. The government’s first hurdle would be to prove that
preventing students and faculty from carrying concealed weapons actually made campus a safer place. The same problems of acquiring statistical proof that accompanied
concealed-carry permits in general would apply: statistical analysis of concealed-carry
laws is extremely inconclusive.172 With only eleven schools currently allowing concealed carrying, there is little data to draw upon.173 Without statistical proof, the state
most likely would not be able to meet the burden of proving that the ban actually made
campus safer.174
The bans are also arbitrarily over-inclusive. Everyone is prevented from carrying
concealed weapons, including those students and faculty who already have a permit
from the state allowing them to carry concealed weapons everywhere else.175 These
individuals would have met the state’s requirements for concealed carrying, including,
in most states, being of the minimum age, taking a safety class, and submitting to a
background check.176 One could go from being a licensed law-abiding citizen on one
168
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city block to breaking gun laws on the next by crossing onto school property. This
arbitrary change in status would cut against the state under a strict scrutiny analysis.
Failing the “fit” requirement of strict scrutiny, prohibitions against campus carrying
face legitimate challenges in the future.
Some scholars and gun control advocates have drawn a parallel between gun regulations and First Amendment time, place, and manner restrictions.177 They argue that
because the fundamental right to free speech is subject to reasonable, narrowly tailored
restrictions, so too can firearm ownership be subject to similar regulations.178 Applying free speech time, place, and manner analysis to gun-free zones requires a showing
of a legitimate governmental purpose, narrow tailoring of the law, and maintaining
alternate avenues of exercising the right.179
As already addressed, the compelling interest prong will be easily met, but narrow
tailoring will be unlikely. Also influencing the element of narrow tailoring in the
parallel to free speech restrictions are considerations of the location of the gun-free
zone, its size, and the government’s ability to enforce the gun-free status.180 On college campuses, depending on the school, the zone could be quite extensive, covering
an individual’s work, school, recreation, and home.181 With college campuses often
being open to the public, the ability to control the flow of weapons onto campus
would be virtually impossible, making the prohibition less likely to achieve the stated
purpose.182 These factors, in addition to the above discussion of narrow tailoring
under strict scrutiny, lead to the conclusion that gun-free zones are not narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling governmental purpose.
The third factor of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, namely, alternate avenues for exercising the right, also fails in the context of guns on campus. The
analysis of alternative means of exercising the right “depends on the extent to which
people have a choice (and the means) to avoid the gun-free zone and exercise their
right elsewhere.”183 While a campus gun-free zone is not as restrictive as an entire city
ban, such as Washington, D.C.’s, many students spend the majority of their time on
campus and would have little opportunity for exercising their right elsewhere. In
addition, as all but a few campuses prohibit firearms, students do not have many
177
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options for choosing to attend a school where firearms are allowed, unless they live
in Utah.184 If firearms are prohibited on campus, there are very few alternative ways to
exercise the right to keep and bear arms. Given this analysis, laws prohibiting campus
carry will fail the reasonable time, place, and manner test of First Amendment free
speech restrictions, and will not survive strict scrutiny.
2. Firearms in Dorms and Protecting Hearth and Home
Laws that make college campuses completely gun-free zones also outlaw firearms in dormitories.185 In addition to the safety concerns that are at play in allowing
students to carry concealed weapons on campus, colleges and gun control advocates
argue that college students are an at-risk group, thus, the school has a compelling
interest in limiting students’ gun ownership on campus.186 Dangers of alcohol abuse,
theft, and suicide are all factors when a large number of young people are living
together.187 These dangers are exacerbated by the presence of firearms.188 All of these
factors, combined with the general understanding that safety is a compelling interest
for the state in regulating firearms, would satisfy the compelling interest of the state
in limiting gun ownership in dorms.
This rationale for limiting gun ownership on campus, however, would not withstand strict scrutiny’s “fit” requirement. The prohibitions are not narrowly tailored
to achieve the stated purpose. The state establishes the standards required for gun
ownership, including minimum age requirements, background checks, and safety
classes.189 The college student who legally owns a gun has already met the state’s
requirements for gun ownership. Taking away the right to own arms in the home
purely because the individual chooses to pursue higher education and live on campus
is arbitrary and greatly over-inclusive. The same student living off campus would be
a legal gun owner.
While the extent of the right to bear arms has not been fully defined, the Supreme
Court was very clear in Heller that certain limitations are categorically unconstitutional,
184

See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
Some statutes explicitly prohibit guns in dorms. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.425o(1) (West 2009) (“[A]n individual licensed under this act to carry a concealed pistol,
or who is exempt from licensure under section 12a(f), shall not carry a concealed pistol on the
premises of any of the following: . . . (h) A dormitory or classroom of a community college, college, or university.”). Other statutes generally outlaw guns in all school buildings without specifying dorms. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(1)(a) (2008) (“A permitholder may carry a
concealed handgun anywhere in Nebraska, except any: . . . building, grounds, vehicle, or sponsored activity or athletic event of any public, private, denominational, or parochial . . . school, . . .
a community college, or a public or private college, junior college, or university . . . .”).
186
BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 171, at 6–9.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See, e.g., Andrus, supra note 124, at 131.
185

854

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:831

“includ[ing] the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
home.”190 A law that keeps an individual from exercising their right to self-defense
in the home is not going to withstand strict scrutiny.
One of the tests for determining whether a law is constitutional is looking to see
if it allows for alternative methods of exercising the right being threatened.191 In
Heller, the Court acknowledged that outlawing handguns did not remove all possibilities for self-defense, but the D.C. handgun ban was held unconstitutional because
it removed the most common method of self-defense, rendering many people without viable alternatives: “Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their
use is invalid.”192 By prohibiting gun ownership on campus, colleges have effectively
removed any opportunity for students to own guns in their homes. Removing the
option for having a firearm in the home eliminates the right of college students who
live on campus to exercise their right to keep and bear arms in the same way that residents of Washington, D.C. were prevented from exercising their right. This indicates
that banning gun ownership on campus is an unconstitutional restraint on the right
to bear arms.
Outlawing guns in dorms also creates a conflict between enforcement of gun laws
and the right to self-defense. Policies of self-defense guarantee the right to use force
if certain requirements are met, such as imminence, necessity, and proportionality.193
Laws prohibiting handguns in dorm rooms prevent a student from keeping a handgun in his dorm for defense in legitimately threatening situations. If such a situation
arose, the student could expose himself to discipline from the school or possible criminal sanctions for violating gun policy. In such an extreme situation, which law takes
priority? The student has a right to defend himself, but not to own the gun that he uses
in his defense? In a post-Heller, post-incorporation case involving gun bans in dorms,
courts would examine the fit between the gun law and other essential rights like selfdefense. If the ban rendered the right to self-defense with a firearm non-existent,
courts would find it necessary to eliminate the ban.
190
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CONCLUSION
Whether one believes that fewer restrictions on firearms will make the country
a safer or a more dangerous place, it is clear that significant changes in the gun debate
are upon us, and firearms regulation is entering a new era. The only issue authoritatively settled by Heller was the individual/collective rights debate.194 The Court
must still decide whether the Second Amendment applies to the states and what standard of review should apply to future Second Amendment challenges. By finding
an individual right to bear arms, the Court has opened the door to strict scrutiny of
federal and state regulations of handguns, thus allowing for gun regulations across
the country to be challenged and possibly overturned.
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